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Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example,
that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann,
2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about
future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in
propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these
capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah,
2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. I evaluate the case for rat rationality by
analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive
inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behav-
iors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted
for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or
associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not
necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet
insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an
experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats.
Keywords: causal reasoning, goal orientation, metacognition, rationality, transitive inference
Recently researchers have become excited
about the possibility that rats may be rational
(e.g., Clayton & Dickinson, 2006). The issue is
of great import because rationality1 is a high-
level cognitive ability with major implications
for our view of animals. For example, Savanah
(2012) argues that the concept possession re-
quired for reasoning implies self-consciousness
and Rödl (2007) argues that a nexus exists be-
tween self-consciousness and reasoning, which
he even claims is the “principle thought of Kant
and Hegel” (p. 109). We still debate whether
even our closest animal relatives, chimpanzees,
are self-conscious, so a conclusion that rats are
self-conscious is of major significance. Howso-
ever, even without accepting a link between
rationality and self-consciousness we should in-
sist on a high level of evidence before accepting
that rats can reason.
In what follows I examine experimental par-
adigms in which researchers claim rationality in
rats explicitly or implicitly, as indicated by the
use of terms such as ‘inference,’ ‘problem-
solving,’2 ‘propositional thought,’ and so on. I
consider examples of five key and arguably
representative research paradigms and allied ex-
periments to examine in this regard: spatial nav-
igation, metacognition, transitive inference,
causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I con-
clude that the evidence for rationality in rats is
not yet convincing. I end by proposing an ex-
perimental paradigm (the Staircase Test) that
sets the bar very high for demonstrating ratio-
1 I elaborate further on my usage of ‘rationality’ under
“What Counts as Rationality?” but I wish it to be clear from
the start that by rationality I mean explicitly the ability to
reason.
2 Where ‘problem-solving’ refers specifically to a process
of inferential reasoning rather than coming across a solution
via random actions.
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nality yet would provide convincing evidence
that rats can reason.
What Counts as Rationality?
The concept of rationality I investigate refers
to the process of conscious, inferential reason-
ing, or what Kacelnik (2006) refers to as ‘PP-
rationality’ (for ‘philosophical/psychological’
usage): “To judge whether behavior is PP-
rational one needs to establish if it is caused by
beliefs that have emerged from a reasoning pro-
cess” (p. 89). Familiar examples of reasoning in
humans are deductive reasoning, inductive rea-
soning and abductive reasoning, the antithesis
of which is behavior that is elicited as an auto-
matic response. Of course it is a fair assumption
that cognitive capacities fall along a continuum
between these putative extremes. Indeed, with
regard to observations of animal behavior in
general and laboratory rats in particular there is
growing acceptance that the “available compar-
ative evidence does not fit comfortably into
either the traditional associationist or classically
inferential alternatives” (Penn & Povinelli,
2007, p. 98). Furthermore, it is possible that
rational and nonrational processes might coexist
in the rat, as they sometimes do in humans.
Indeed, under “Goal Orientation” below I dis-
cuss an experiment (the ‘Palermo Protocol’)
that may in fact indicate an intermediate condi-
tion in the rat subjects. As such, setting the
threshold for what we should count as reasoning
is difficult and may appear somewhat arbitrary.
Keeping such considerations in mind my ap-
proach is to set the bar high, such that finding
rat subjects reaching this bar would represent a
substantial breakthrough. Thus, rationality as
here discussed involves thoughts occurring
within the ‘space of reasons,’ implying concept
possession. Therefore, to accept behavior as
evidence of reasoning in rats we must eliminate
plausible noncognitive explanations. Accord-
ingly, we must reject as evidence any behavior
that is species typical or acquired through asso-
ciative learning or is otherwise ‘programmatic’
and thus not reliant on possession of concepts.
A definition of ‘concept’ is notoriously diffi-
cult to pin down but for our purposes everyday
usage will suffice. To have a concept of some-
thing is to have an idea or understanding about
what it is. Concepts are required for reasoning
but some entities that appear to behave ratio-
nally do not possess concepts. For example,
chess-playing computers seem to reason but
merely execute programmed instructions. They
do not possess concepts and it is fair to say that
most philosophers would not want to ascribe
beliefs to them (Schwitzgebel, 2011). Analo-
gous behavior in living organisms include ge-
netically hard-wired species typical behavior or
behavior shaped by Pavlovian learning, al-
though the ‘programming’ in the former case
occurs via natural selection and in the latter case
by associative learning. Nevertheless, these pro-
grammed behaviors can be expressed by organ-
isms that are not rational in the sense we are
discussing, that is, signifying concept posses-
sion.
Of course by the above reasoning we could
observe much human behavior and similarly
argue that it is not evidence of concept posses-
sion. Indeed, the human brain has also been
sculpted by evolution and people often behave
in programmatic ways. For example, noncon-
scious mechanisms can influence decision-
making, such as when ethnic background music
in a wine shop unknowingly engenders a bias
toward purchasing wines from that region
(North, Hargreaves, & McKendrick, 1999).
However, in the human case concept possession
can be established by several means. First, we
know what it is like to possess concepts—we
have the personal experience of concept posses-
sion. Second, we observe in humans decidedly
nonprogrammatic behaviors, such as when rea-
soning is applied to solve novel problems.
Third, language provides direct evidence of ab-
stract (conceptual) thought.3 Accordingly, al-
though it may be true that “neuroscience tells
[us that] the brain is an association machine—
one way or another, all of its acquired and
innate functions are based on associations” (H.
Eichenbaum, personal communication, June 25,
2013), it is also nevertheless true that there is
something special about the human mind.
3 Some would go as far as suggesting that reasoning is not
even possible without natural language (Carruthers, 1996).
However, I am open to the possibility that such thoughts
might take place in a type of ‘Mentalese’ (Fodor, 1975) and
consequently rats and other animals should not be precluded
from the possibility of inferential thinking solely on the
basis of their lack of natural language. Conceivably, non-
linguistic organisms might be able to engage in inferential
thinking without the capacity to possess those thoughts in
propositional form.
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Emerging from the development of the most
sophisticated of all ‘association machines’ is the
further capacity for reasoning that transcends
programmatic behavior. Studies (e.g., Frank,
O’Reilly, & Curran, 2006) suggest the opera-
tion of dual mechanisms for human decision
making: some on the basis of explicit reasoning
processes and others on the basis of implicit
reward associations. We know humans operate
under this dual psychology, but do other ani-
mals? Do chimpanzees? Maybe. What about
rats?
Kacelnik contrasts PP-rationality with E-ra-
tionality (economic rationality) and B-rational-
ity (evolutionary biological rationality). E-Ra-
tionality focuses on whether behavior is
consistent with the ‘maximization of utility,’
interpretable as maximization of energy effi-
ciency in the context of ecology, whereas B-ra-
tionality represents behavior driven by genetic
predispositions. Neither E-rationality nor B-ra-
tionality is necessarily dependent on a process
of reasoning.4 Nevertheless, in the cases I dis-
cuss there are clear explicit or implicit refer-
ences to PP-rationality, implying actual inferen-
tial reasoning by the rat subjects.
The point made earlier about computer algo-
rithms—that their behavior is programmatic
and does not involve reasoning—provides one
class of objection against claims of rationality in
rats. What happens in the rat’s brain is undoubt-
edly more sophisticated than a chess computer’s
number crunching, but if we can use computers
to simulate animal responses to stimuli using
noncognitive systems such as mathematical
models then this suggests that the animal be-
havior, too, might be programmatic (e.g., De
Lillo, Floreano, & Antinucci, 2001). In other
words, like the computer, the behavior might
not be caused by “beliefs that have emerged
from a reasoning process.” Of course that does
not preclude rationality because rats might con-
ceivably also behave under a dual psychology5
like humans. But because a plausible, noncog-
nitive alternative account exists, we cannot
claim the behavior as conclusive evidence of
reasoning.
Another class of objection is related to what
I call ‘nonzero effects.’ For example, reasoning
such as ‘this lever provides a sickness-inducing
drink, therefore I must avoid it’ predicts zero
lever presses but the results are usually only a
relative reduction. Furthermore, a comparison
with similar human results need not imply that
rats are therefore capable of reasoning like hu-
mans; an alternative interpretation is that hu-
mans are capable of reacting through noncog-
nitive processes like rats. Indeed, this last point
can be generalized: where animal and human
behavior in an experiment are comparable this
should not necessarily be taken as strong evi-
dence of reasoning in the rat; the evidence must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
I argue below that the threshold for rational-
ity, as set earlier, has not been reached in any of
the experimental paradigms discussed. In many
cases the argument centers on the availability of
nonrationality based accounts. I acknowledge
that this does not on its own preclude the pos-
sibility of rationality in rats. Nevertheless, the
claim that rats are rational is of such magnitude
that the onus of proof is clearly on the claimant
and we should hold such claims to a high stan-
dard of evidence. If behaviors can be accounted
for without assuming rationality then those be-
haviors cannot be considered sufficient evi-
dence of rationality.
Rationality and Self-Consciousness
It is important to know whether rats or other
animals are able to reason, as this would indi-
cate concept possession. I have elsewhere ar-
gued that concept possession alone is sufficient
evidence for self-consciousness (Savanah,
2012), where ‘self-consciousness’ is construed
as an understanding of one’s own existence as a
psychological subject with intentional agency. I
argue that to possess any concept the self-
concept must be present. The argument is
rooted in the theory of nonconceptual content
and defends the claim that the only factor sep-
4 In some cases ‘maximization of utility’ might involve
inferential reasoning but it can also be achieved by noncog-
nitive processes. This needs to be examined on a case-by-
case basis. The point is that only PP-rationality refers spe-
cifically to the process of reasoning.
5 Daw, Niv, and Dayan (2005) have shown computational
competition exists between two areas of rat brains and that
habit-formation is a process of transferring control from the
prefrontal cortex to the dorsolateral striatum; however, this
need not indicate a ‘dual psychology’ in the sense used for
humans (despite the homologous brain areas in rats and
humans). Rather, I suggest it is another case of E-rationality
whereby processing is optimized via a Bayesian process
(which indeed might apply to humans also). These issues
are further discussed under “Causal Reasoning.”
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arating organisms that are conscious but not
self-conscious from organisms that are both
conscious and self-conscious is concept posses-
sion. If this claim is correct, insofar as reasoning
requires concept possession, rational organisms
must also be self-conscious. Thus, where con-
vincing evidence exists for rationality in ani-
mals, including rats, I am bound to consider
them self-conscious.
In an earlier work (Savanah, 2012) I empha-
sized that concept possession—like rationality—is
most likely not an ‘all-or-nothing’ capacity. In-
deed, neither is self-consciousness: to the extent
that a creature may have only a partial capacity
for concept possession, it would have partial
capacity for self-consciousness. Once again, the
threshold is not well-defined. Nevertheless, the
higher we set the required standard of evidence
the closer we come to human-like self-
consciousness.
Spatial Navigation
Even relatively simple organisms can per-
form impressive-seeming feats of spatial navi-
gation. For example, Tarsitano and Jackson
(1997) showed that jumping spiders of the ge-
nus Portia can navigate a route to a perceived
prey even when the route includes a section
forcing the spider to lose visual contact with the
prey. Nevertheless, virtually all organisms, in-
cluding those not usually associated with pos-
sessing conceptual abilities, navigate their envi-
ronments. Accordingly, spatial navigation does
not seem to rely on conceptualization or reason-
ing ability. Nevertheless, some authors do ap-
pear to ascribe rationality to animals based on
their spatial navigation abilities (e.g., Eichen-
baum, 2000).
The hippocampus in rats has long been
known to play a significant role in spatial nav-
igation (Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 2008). How-
ever, Eichenbaum (2000) has suggested that
“the hippocampus may be required for new
problem solving in familiar environments” (p.
45, emphasis added). As I discuss in later sec-
tions, we must remain cautious with respect to
interpretations regarding brain regions homolo-
gous between rats and humans. Although the
hippocampus probably performs some common
functions across species, we do not have enough
justification to infer that humans’ higher hip-
pocampal functions (such as, perhaps, its con-
tribution to reasoning) is replicated in the rats’.
Indeed, evidence suggests that there is no single
‘logic’ module and human brain systems for
reasoning are dynamically extended beyond the
hippocampus (Goel, Makale, & Grafman,
2004).
Eichenbaum describes experiments using the
Morris Water Maze in which a tank of water has
a single column standing just below the surface
as a refuge for rats: “when rats with hippocam-
pal damage that have successfully learned to
locate the escape platform from a single start
position are tested from new start positions,
they fail to readily locate the platform. In con-
trast, normal animals swim directly to the es-
cape locus on each new probe trial” (Eichen-
baum, 2000, p. 45). These results and other
findings (e.g., Nadel & MacDonald, 1980) sup-
port the view that the rat hippocampus is in-
volved in spatial memory. Nevertheless, these
findings do not necessarily implicate the hip-
pocampus in inferential thinking or any type of
conceptual thought, as some seem to suggest.
For example, O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) sug-
gest that the rat’s cognitive mapping system
allows the animal to link conceptually diverse
parts of an environment. However, their theory
need not assume an advanced cognitive capac-
ity to effectively account for rat behavior. De-
spite their descriptions of an animal’s spatial
abilities as ‘knowledge’ or ‘knowing that,’ their
view easily conforms to a model devoid of
conceptual abilities. Their model still works
when we substitute ‘information’ (by which I
mean to imply its nonconceptual nature) for
‘knowledge’ (which is conceptual) as in this
example regarding the role of evolution: “an
innate spatial mode of perception could be de-
veloped which would confer upon the perceiver
accurate knowledge [information] of certain as-
pects of the external world” (p. 23). My point is
that it is sufficient to consider the cognitive map
as encoding nonconceptual spatial information
that is available to hard-wired (i.e., program-
matic) information processing mechanisms.
Cheng (1986) describes the rat’s cognitive
map as a ‘metric frame’ that specifies locations
primarily by their geometric relations to envi-
ronmental shape. The experimental evidence
implicates the hippocampus in the formation
and maintenance of the metric frame, but it does
not follow that in using the metric frame for
navigation, as in the water maze experiment,
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that inferential reasoning is needed to ‘solve’
the problem of locating the escape platform.
The metric frame might simply be the encoding
of the localized environmental geometry acces-
sible via the rat’s hippocampus.
Metacognition
Tests for metacognition in animals have mostly
relied on a ‘bail-out’ paradigm (e.g., Foote &
Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001, 2005; Smith,
2005; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003). For
example, Smith (2005) investigated the ability of
rhesus macaques to judge their own confidence at
visual density discrimination tasks. After training,
the subjects are to judge whether a box of pixels
on a computer screen is dense or sparse according
to a set threshold, and are rewarded for a correct
answer. For a lesser but guaranteed reward the
subject also has the option to decline the test, in
effect to answer with a response of ‘uncertain.’
Judgments of this type are deemed to be acts of
metacognition because the subject bases a deci-
sion not on the density of the box but apparently
on knowledge of its own ability to succeed at the
task. In Hampton’s (2001) paradigm the subjects
must decide (after a varying delay) whether they
can still remember which of four randomly se-
lected images they had just seen. Hampton found
that the longer the delay, the more likely the
monkeys were to bail out of the test and settle for
a lesser reward.6
It can be argued that metacognition construed
as the capacity to monitor one’s ability to discrim-
inate between stimuli or remember an image rep-
resents a case of rationality. However, Mitchell
(2002) has suggested that the monkey’s choices in
the Hampton (2001) experiments might only dem-
onstrate simple rule-following without awareness
of possession of the relevant mental image: if an
internal image persists when the choice is pre-
sented then take the test, or if it does not persist,
then bail out. Le Pelley (2012) was able to repro-
duce the monkey results using simulations based
on a simple model of reinforcement learning. Be-
cause the simulation was based on a noncognitive
system it is plausible that the monkeys also ap-
plied a noncognitive system rather than reasoning.
Here I take a different approach, suggesting that
the findings of experiments using the bail-out par-
adigm on rats can be explained in terms of first-
order stimulus-response associative learning.7
Smith (2005) dismisses associative learning
as an explanation, but his position relies on
assuming that the subjects’ associations to re-
ward are dipolar (e.g., based on options such as
‘dense vs. sparse’ or ‘same vs. different’). Be-
low, in my analysis of the rat metacognition
experiments, I argue that there is a potential for
an association to be formed for a third (unin-
tended) option—that is, the bail-out option itself
represents a third stimulus that becomes associ-
ated with the lesser reward.
Metacognition in Rats
Foote and Crystal (2007) trained rats over
seven weeks at two hours per session for 35
sessions using tones of eight different durations
ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The four shorter
tones were associated with a ‘Left’ lever for a
reward, whereas the four longer ones were as-
sociated with the ‘Right’ lever for the reward.
The two tones in the middle of the range were the
most difficult to classify as long or short. In the
‘Choice’ condition of the test phase, after pre-
sentation of a tone, the rat had the option of
entering one of two apertures. In aperture 1
(‘take-the-test’) were the two levers, Left and
Right, in which pressing the correct lever pro-
duced a reward of six food pellets. In aperture 2
(‘decline-the-test’) the rat obtained a guaranteed
but lesser reward of three food pellets (see Fig-
ure 1). In the ‘Forced’ condition only aperture 1
was available. Choice and Forced tests were
intermixed randomly throughout the session.
Each session lasted 9 hours and rats underwent
an average of 1,546 trials.
In Choice trials, for tones near each extreme
(long or short) rats were more likely to enter
6 Hampton (2001) and Smith et al. (2003) observed that
the choice patterns are similar between humans and mon-
keys in these experiments. However, as mentioned in the
introduction and also noted by several other authors (e.g.,
see peer commentary on the Smith et al., 2003 target article
by Campos & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003; King, 2003; Met-
calfe, 2003; Shettleworth & Sutton, 2003; and Zentall,
2003) this is not strong evidence that the underlying mech-
anisms must be the same, or indeed that metacognition was
necessarily involved even in the human case.
7 Carruthers’ (2003, 2008) account of the Smith (2005)
results is not dissimilar to the one I present here, but there
is a crucial difference: Carruthers is willing to ascribe
beliefs to the subjects as part of his explanation. Holding
propositional attitudes such as belief would imply concept
possession, which I deny in my account.
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aperture 1, presumably indicating confidence of
their own ability to make a correct lever selec-
tion. For the harder to discriminate middle
tones, the rats were more likely to enter aperture
2, presumably indicating lower confidence and
so taking the option for the lower guaranteed
reward. Furthermore, for the middle tones only,
accuracy in the Left/Right choice was higher in
the Choice trials compared with the Forced tri-
als, which seems to support the view that the
rats declined the choice because of their inabil-
ity to decide on the correct lever.
Assuming that strength of association is a
function of reward value and reward reliability,
a stimulus–response that is rewarded every time
will result in a stronger association than for one
that is rewarded only half the time. Thus, a tone
duration at either extreme (long or short) which
the subject can easily discriminate reliably re-
sults in a high value reward, resulting in a
strong association with the required response
(correct lever selection). However, the middle
duration tones are harder to discriminate be-
tween long or short and result in more errors
being made. In those cases they are just as likely
to get a reward as to not get a reward no matter
which lever they press; therefore, it is dubious
that those durations will form associations with
either lever. So, during the training phase, al-
though strong associations will be formed for
both the very long and very short tones, a third
possibility exists that little or no association is
formed for the middle tones.
Given the lack of associations formed for the
middle tones during training, there is reason to
believe associations formed during the test
phase. In effect training did not end with the
initial training phase, but continued through the
relatively long test phase when the reward struc-
ture was different. Notice that in the test phase
there are three possibilities in the reward sched-
ule: six pellets; three pellets and no pellets.
During the test phase, the rat is able to form new
associations involving aperture 2, which always
yields a small reward. These latter associations,
being of lesser reward, are not likely to override
the previously established stronger associations
for long/short, provided, as is the case, those
associations remain well rewarded. However,
new associations can be established for the in-
termediate duration tones because they did not
form strong associations during the training
phase. So, along with the strong associations of
the long and short tones with their paired levers
and food rewards, a new association is free to be
established between the middle tones and aper-
ture 2. Instead of a choice of either ‘long’ or
‘short’ plus a metacognitive understanding of ‘I
cannot tell,’ the choices may have actually been
‘long,’ ‘short’ and ‘intermediate,’ with no meta-
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of rat metacognition experiment.
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cognition involved. Including ‘intermediate’ as
a possible discrimination, Table 1 lists all the
associations possible according to the available
behavior options.
Table 1 shows that for Choice trials there are
three behavior paths for each of the three avail-
able discriminations: long, short, or intermedi-
ate. The final column in the table indicates the
strength of incentive for each of the available
actions following discrimination. For a discrim-
ination of ‘long,’ the strongest incentive is be-
havior L3 (enter aperture 1 and select the right
lever). Similarly, for a discrimination of ‘short’
behavior S4 is preferred (enter aperture 1 and
select the left lever). A discrimination of ‘inter-
mediate,’ I5, though weakly incentivized com-
pared to L3 and S4, is nevertheless more favor-
able than the available alternatives. This
associative model correctly predicts the ob-
served behavior of the rats. As such, there is no
need to assume metacognitive abilities in rats to
account for these experimental results.
On the intermediate stimuli (only), the rats
scored a higher proportion of correct selections
on the Choice trials compared with the Forced
trials. Foote and Crystal (2007) claim that this
finding supports metacognitive explanations but
not associative ones. In fact the three-stimulus
paradigm presented above does predict this ef-
fect8 and therefore provides more support for
the noncognitive account. Consider Figure 2,
which shows the stimulus duration lengths (ver-
tical lines) along with a possible9 range of mis-
perceptions (error spreads) centered on each of
the two intermediate stimuli (3.62 sec and 4.42
sec). When the rat’s perception (or mispercep-
tion) falls within the intermediate range it will
enter the associated aperture for the three-pellet
reward, as proposed above. Nevertheless, if it
makes a larger error prompting it to ‘take-the-
test,’ it is much more likely to err in the ‘cor-
rect’ direction (i.e., in the 4.42 sec case it will
likely err on the ‘long’ side, whereas in the 3.62
sec case it will err on the short side). Therefore,
on the Choice trials, the ‘take-the-test’ aperture
will be overrepresented with fortuitous errors
(inadvertently correct choices), which inflates
the accuracy. This sampling bias does not apply
to the Forced trials, which will have equal bal-
ance between fortuitous and unfortunate errors.
Furthermore, Foote and Crystal (2007) argue
that associative accounts presuppose that, con-
trary to other evidence, rats are risk averse; that
is, that they prefer guaranteed small rewards
over uncertain large ones. Yet quite to the con-
trary, noncognitive accounts presuppose no
such cognitive abilities at all. Even using termi-
nology such as ‘risk-averse’ and ‘risk-prone’
already presupposes a higher level of cognition
than is necessary. We cannot tell that the rats
are deliberately judging risks; we can only ob-
serve that they are behaving in a way that max-
imizes pay-off. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, this type of behavior might only indicate a
case of E-Rationality, as discussed next.
Behavioral Economic Model (BEM)
Jozefowiez, Staddon, and Cerutti’s (2009)
Behavioral Economic Model explains the Foote
and Crystal’s (2007) results in terms of pay-off
maximization—as a case of E-Rationality,
which as earlier discussed is not a case of in-
ferential reasoning. This mathematical model is
based on only two assumptions: (a) when con-
fronted with a stimulus a subject emits the be-
havior associated with the higher pay-off; and
(b) the perception of the stimulus is noisy (i.e.,
the rats’ perception has an error spread as dis-
cussed in the previous section). The ‘noisiness’
is effected with a Gaussian distribution function
to simulate the spread of possible stimuli in the
variable tone duration experiment. On adjusting
certain parameters, such as the degree of ‘pref-
erence’ for lesser rewards (i.e., what Foote and
Crystal might erroneously refer to as the level of
‘risk aversion’) assumed for the subject and the
width of the Gaussian probability curve, the
model does a fair job of predicting the behavior
observed in the rat experiments. Accordingly
Jozefowiez et al. argue that metacognition is not
needed to explain the observed results in rats:
BEM, which lacks any metacognitive ability—only
basic discrimination processes—satisfies the two gen-
erally accepted criteria for metacognition: that the
probability of picking the uncertain response increases
with the difficulty of the task. . .and that the subject is
more accurate on free-choice trials then on forced-
choice trials. (p. 33)
8 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting
this analysis.
9 The argument holds no matter how wide the range.
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Transitive Inference
The phenomenon of mediated conditioning
has been known for several decades (e.g.,
Savastano & Miller, 1998). Two different pair-
ings containing one common element elicit an
association between the two unpaired elements
(e.g., (a) A paired with B; and (b) B paired with
C; causes (c) A associated with C). That such
cross-associations can be trained in animals is
no cause—on their own—to suggest the pres-
ence of inferential reasoning. However, some
researchers (e.g., Eichenbaum, 2000) have sug-
gested that rats are capable of transitive infer-
ence, in which they infer specific relations be-
tween the unpaired elements. For example,
elements A and B are paired such that A is
rewarded but not B, thereby training the subject
to prefer A over B. Then B is paired with C such
that B is rewarded but not C, so that B is
preferred to C (see Figure 3). Then the subjects
are presented with A and C to determine which
is preferred.
Transitive inference is implicated if A is pre-
ferred over C. Note that in this paradigm it
could be argued that subjects will prefer A over
C because C has never been rewarded and this
explanation does not rely on transitive inference
(Allen, 2006). For this reason it is common
practice to use five elements (A, B, C, D, and E)
and to compare B and D so as to ensure that the
Table 1
The Full Range of Possible Associations in the Foote and Crystal (2007) Experiment
Tone duration Cond.
Behavior
Reward level Trained effectID Aperture Lever
Long Forced L1 Take test Right High Strong association
L2 Take test Left Zero Negative association
Choice L3 Take test Right High Strong association
L4 Take test Left Zero Negative association
L5 Decline N/A Small Weak association
Intermediate Forced I1 Take test Right (Indeterminate) (Indeterminate)
I2 Take test Left (Indeterminate) (Indeterminate)
Choice I3 Take test Right (Indeterminate) (Indeterminate)
I4 Take test Left (Indeterminate) (Indeterminate)
I5 Decline N/A Small Weak association
Short Forced S1 Take test Right Zero Negative association
S2 Take test Left High Strong association
Choice S3 Take test Right Zero Negative association
S4 Take test Left High Strong association
S5 Decline N/A Small Weak association
Note. When presented with each of the three discriminable options, this matrix correctly predicts the observed behavior.
Figure 2. Most errors for ‘intermediate’ stimuli are fortuitously correct, which accounts for
the greater accuracy on free-choice tests.
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compared elements have had equal measures of
reinforcement and to avoid any other boundary
effects (e.g., Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996;
Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997). Below, I describe
the experimental paradigm, an explanation of
the findings that assumes rationality on the part
of the subjects, and alternative interpretations
that do not rely on reasoning ability.
The Five-Element Transitive
Inference Paradigm
Labeling the odors as A, B, C, D, and E, and
using the ‘’ symbol to represent preference,
the trained preferences can be expressed as A
B; B  C; C  D; D  E (Eichenbaum, 2000).
In probe trials following the training, rats
showed a preference of B over D (B  D)
despite the fact that both were equally rewarded
in their original pairings. According to Eichen-
baum (2000), the rats “showed a robust capacity
for transitive inference, indicating that rats are
capable of linking information about the odors
acquired across distinct experiences, and of
making inferential judgments based on knowl-
edge about the orderly series” (p. 46, emphasis
added). The strength of Eichenbaum’s claim
that this amounts to a case of inference rests on
two key factors. First, B and D are not merely
associated; rather, the inherent relation between
B and D appears to have been inferred based on
the hierarchy established during training. Sec-
ond, although normal rats were able to express
this relation, a second group of rats with in-
duced hippocampal damage was not, even
though this latter group was able to acquire the
individual pairings at normal rate. As argued
next, although these findings show that the hip-
pocampus is critical to the transitive inference
effect observed in rats, it does not necessarily
support a conclusion of inferential reasoning in
rats.
Hippocampus in Rats and Humans
Given the importance of the hippocampus in
humans for higher cognitive capacities such as
declarative memory, it is tempting to ascribe the
same or at least similar functionality for the
hippocampus in animals like the rat. Bunsey
and Eichenbaum (1996) compared their transi-
tive inference studies in rats to analogous stud-
ies with humans and write: “in both humans and
animals, stimuli can be associated indepen-
dently of hippocampal function but the estab-
lishment of representations that can be ex-
pressed indirectly and inferentially is critically
supported by the hippocampus” (p. 257). How-
ever, we should be cautious about ascribing
higher cognitive capacities such as inferential
reasoning to animals based on the similarity of
human/animal brain components. Indeed, there
is evidence that the hippocampus in rats is re-
sponsible for the transitive inference effect as a
noncognitive process.
Van Elzakker, O’Reilly, and Rudy (2003)
investigated the role of the hippocampus in tran-
sitive inference experiments. The researchers
reproduced the five-element experimental re-
sults and also conducted a six-element version
(A  B; B  C; C  D; D  E; E  F). In the
latter variation, rats tested with (B vs. E) chose
B more often than rats tested with (B vs. D).
According to Van Elzakker et al. (2003) this
finding is inconsistent with the logical inference
account, which predicts no difference in (B vs.
Figure 3. Schematic depiction of Transitive Inference experiment (three elements).
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D) and (B vs. E). Nevertheless, both the six-
element and five-element results are consistent
with their ‘excitatory strength’ theory, which
argues that because E was trained against stim-
ulus F (which was never reinforced) the animal
simply learns to avoid F and thus assigns less
excitatory value to E relative to D (see the value
transfer theory below). Van Elzakker et al.
(2003) suggest the possibility that the hip-
pocampus is responsible for encoding the excit-
atory values rather than providing the neural
substrate for the kind of relational comparison
necessary for inference.
The Value Transfer Theory
Allen (2006) provides a succinct description
of the value transfer theory: “even though B and
D are individually rewarded at the same rate, B
is seen in association with A, which is always a
winner. This is hypothesized to give B a posi-
tive boost in comparison to D” (p. 177).
Whereas Van Elzakker et al. (2003) used a
six-element paradigm to test this theory, Zentall
(2001) describes an alternative approach that
positively demonstrates this effect. Although
Zentall used pigeons in his experiments rather
than rats, the results are striking and deserve
much greater attention than they have so far
garnered. In the experiment two pairs of stimuli
were differentially rewarded: stimulus A was
rewarded 100% of the time over B that was
never rewarded; and C was rewarded 50% of
the time over D that was never rewarded (de-
noted A100B0; C50D0). When B was tested
against D, B was preferentially selected, as pre-
dicted by the value transfer theory. Zentall con-
cluded, “These results support value transfer
theory and suggest that it may not be necessary
to posit an ordered representation of the stimuli
experienced during transitive-inference train-
ing” (p. 74).
Zentall (2001) describes further pigeon ex-
periments that disclose the fact that the value
transfer theory alone is inadequate and other
quite subtle associative effects need to be ac-
counted for in the context of the transitive in-
ference paradigm. The value transfer theory
predicts that just as A transfers positive value to
B, B should also transfer negative value to A.
To test for negative value transfer Zentall tested
pigeons on (A100B0; C100D50; Test A vs. C).
Negative value transfer predicts that C would be
preferentially selected over A because the low-
value B should ‘drag down’ the value of A by
association, but Zentall found no such effect.
Zentall then increased the subjects’ experience
with the negative stimuli B and D by reinforcing
them in unpaired conditions: (A100B0; C100D50;
B0; D50; Test A vs. C). However, instead of a
preference of C over A as predicted by negative
value transfer, the result was a preference for A
over C! Zentall suggests that rather than a neg-
ative value transfer from B to A, the effect is the
result of ‘positive contrast.’ That is, the value of
A is enhanced by contrast with B (A  100 vs.
B  0) as compared with the differential be-
tween C and D (C  100 vs. D  50). Testing
(A100B0; C50D0; B0; D0; Test B vs. D) yielded
preference for D over B indicating a negative
contrast effect (i.e., B is much worse compared
with A than D is compared with C).
The upshot of these results is that the five-
element test paradigm is inadequate to yield
conclusive evidence of inferential reasoning.
The results so far are still too open to alternative
plausible theoretical interpretations. Zentall’s
pigeon tests ought to be replicated in rats and
should inspire further variations.
Simulations
Relatively simple noncognitive systems can
replicate the transitive inference effect, obviat-
ing the need to assume higher cognitive abilities
such as rationality. De Lillo et al. (2001)
showed that the five-element test results could
be mimicked using a very simple back-
propagating artificial neural network. Given this
performance by a noncognitive system, De Lillo
et al. suggest that “the binary, non-verbal, five-
term-series task might not be suitable for de-
tecting ontogenetic or phylogenetic trends in
the development of the cognitive skills under-
lying inferential abilities” (p. 68). Further-
more, Frank, Rudy, and O’Reilly (2003) used
artificial neural networks to model the hip-
pocampus and their results supported Van
Elzakker et al.’s (2003) excitatory strength
theory. Overall, there exists reasonable doubt
that the transitive inference effect as observed
in rats is sufficient evidence of inferential
reasoning, despite the observed role of the
hippocampus in this effect.
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Causal Reasoning
The term ‘causal reasoning’ could be inter-
preted as a primitive ability to ‘grasp’ the causal
power of objects in a nonconceptual sense (e.g.,
see Hoerl, 2011), such as that an event B is
always followed by event A. This is a case of
associative learning despite the temporal sepa-
ration between the associated events and does
not imply rationality. However, when the ‘rea-
soning’ in ‘causal reasoning’ is understood to
involve inferential thinking, then rationality is
implied. Certainly some researchers and com-
mentators explicitly claim rationality in rats on
this basis (e.g., Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, &
Urushihara, 2006; Clayton & Dickinson, 2006;
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). In
this section I analyze the results of causal rea-
soning experiments. I conclude that although
reasonable cases can be made for ‘causal rea-
soning’ in the nonconceptual sense, this does
not necessarily entail rationality in the terms I
have delineated.
Forward Blocking
Based on their experiments on Pavlovian
conditioning in rats, Beckers et al. (2006) sug-
gest that forward blocking is sensitive to con-
straints of causal inference. Forward blocking is
a term describing the observation that once an
unconditioned stimulus (US) has been paired
with a conditioned stimulus (CS), in subsequent
training that US will not be as strongly associ-
ated with a newly introduced and redundant CS
that is presented alongside the original CS. In
the nomenclature of comparative psychologists,
call the first CS ‘A’; the second ‘X’ and denote
the US as ‘’. The training is A followed by
AX. The observation is that X does not ac-
quire much associative strength; in other words
formation of the association between X and is
blocked. It is as if the subject infers that because
A is already known to be the cause of the US,
then X is probably not a cause of the US.
The forward blocking experiment is best ex-
plained starting with a human example. If Food
A causes an allergic reaction and then Food A
plus Food X causes the same reaction, then the
inference is that since A is a known allergen X
is probably not an allergen. Beckers et al.
(2006) suggest that in humans forward blocking
is the result of “effortful inferential reasoning”
(p. 93). To devise a rat analogue to the human
case, Beckers et al. note that the assumed infer-
ence depends on certain constraints. The con-
clusion that X is not an allergen is reasonable if
the subject assumes that (a) causes are additive
such that two allergens in conjunction should
cause a greater reaction than one alone; and (b)
the ceiling (maximum possible reaction) in the
AX regime has not been reached. In other
words, there is a reason to believe that there
ought to be a greater reaction if X is a contrib-
utor. Then, experiencing the effect of AX to
be the same as A would suggest that X did not
contribute to the effect. Given this, we can make
testable predictions based on the difference be-
tween trials where the ceiling is not reached and
those where it is. In the case where the ceiling is
knowingly not reached subjects will infer that X
is not a contributor (i.e., blocking will occur). In
the case where the ceiling knowingly is reached
subjects will not be able to definitively infer the
causal status of X and therefore blocking should
not occur. Beckers et al. (2006) tested these
predictions in rat analogues of the human ex-
ample given above and obtained positive re-
sults, tending to support a conclusion that rats
are capable of causal inferential reasoning.
Experiment 1 in Beckers et al. (2006) aimed
to train rats to learn that causes are nonadditive
(see ‘nonadditive’ condition in Table 2). This
was done in phase (i) by pairing individual cues
(e.g., tones, buzzers and flashing lights) with a
US (footshock) and also applying combinations
of the cues with the same (not increased) level
of shock (C, D, CD). In phase (ii) the US
was paired with a new stimulus (A); in phase
(iii) the US was paired with a combination of
the phase (ii) stimulus and another new stimulus
(AX) (the control group was trained with B
and then AX). In the test phase the (thirsty)
rats were tested against X alone with a lever
present, which they had been pretrained to press
for water rewards. The relative rate of lever
pressing was used as a measure of the blocking
effect: if the rats associated X with the US (i.e.,
blocking had not occurred) then they should
display a fear effect in the test phase that would
manifest as fewer lever presses. In effect, a
relatively low rate of lever pressing indicates an
inference that X was a cause of the footshock.
As Table 2 shows, the results match predictions.
In the nonadditive condition, both test and con-
trol groups press levers at a low rate: the rats
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have no reason to discount X as a possible
cause. Contrast this with the other two condi-
tions where the default assumption applies, that
causes probably are additive. While in these
cases the control groups cannot rule out X as a
possible cause, the test groups can because they
will ‘reason’ that as A is confirmed as a cause of
the US (in phase ii), X cannot be a cause (else
the footshock would have been of greater inten-
sity).
In contrast to Beckers et al.’s (2006) first
experiment, Experiment 2 was designed to train
the rats to learn that causes are additive and
Experiment 3 was designed to train the rats to
learn that (in the test phase) the US ceiling had
not been reached. Tables 3 and 4 show the
results of Experiments 2 and 3, respectively. I
will not analyze these here as similar principles
were used as for Experiment 1 and the data are
self-explanatory. I leave it to the interested
reader to verify that the results generally tend to
support the hypothesis that rats are capable of
inferring the causal status of X. The question I
address now is whether the experimental results
are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that rats
are capable of inferential reasoning. Although
the experimental design is ingenious and praise-
worthy, I suggest that the results do not justify
a conclusion of “symbolic causal reasoning pro-
cesses” (Beckers et al., 2006, p. 100) in the rat
subjects.
Because the results match the predictions, the
key issue is whether the experiment itself is a
valid indication of rationality. This experiment
derives its legitimacy from replicating or ap-
proximating the actions of humans on the as-
Table 2
Beckers et al.’s (2006) Experiment 1
Condition Group (i) (ii) (iii)
Inference X 
cause?
Expected effect:
Blocking?
Relative lever
pressing
Nonadditive Test C D CD A AX ✓
Control C D CD B AX ✓
Irrelevant element Test C D E A AX ✓
Control C D E B AX ✓
Irrelevant compound Test C C DE A AX ✓
Control C C DE B AX ✓
Table 3
Beckers et al.’s (2006) Experiment 2
Condition Group (i) (ii) (iii)
Inference X 
cause?
Expected effect:
Blocking?
Relative lever
pressing
Additive Test C D CD A AX ✓
Control C D CD B AX ✓
Irrelevant element Test C D E A AX ✓
Control C D E B AX ✓
Irrelevant compound Test C C DE A AX ✓
Control C C DE B AX ✓
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sumption that because humans’ actions are in-
ference-based then so too are the rats. We
should exercise caution in this regard for at least
two reasons. First, it is possible that the same
results can occur due to one mechanism in hu-
mans (inference) and yet another mechanism
(such as association) in rats. As Penn and Pov-
inelli (2007) point out, the inapplicability of
traditional associationist explanations does not
rule out somewhat more sophisticated associa-
tive theories where there is no need to invoke
inferential explanations (I discuss this further
below). Second, it is possible that even the
human actions were not attributable to inference
despite the subjects’ claims. Penn and Povinelli
(2007) point out that inferential explanations of
blocking effects in human studies rely on verbal
self-reports that may be “post hoc redescriptions
of effects initially generated through implicit
nonpropositional mechanisms” (p. 102). In
other words, humans may rationalize actions
that were actually stimulated by nonproposi-
tional mechanisms such as associations. For ex-
ample, in the North et al. (1999) experiment
mentioned earlier, the humans were almost all
unaware of the influence of the background
music on their choice of wine and gave spurious
reasons for their choice. Thus, if the conclusion
of inferential mechanisms in even the human
version of the blocking experiment is in doubt
the comparable results with rats should not be
used to justify that same conclusion.
Another perhaps more compelling reason to
question the validity of the Beckers et al. (2006)
experiments is the fact that Haselgrove (2010)
was able to reproduce the results using mathe-
matical simulations based on the well-known
Rescorla-Wagner associative model (Rescorla
& Wagner, 1972). One potential problem with
Haselgrove’s simulation is that it assumes a
common element in the cues used for pretrain-
ing and blocking, which was not explicit and
(presumably) not intended in Beckers et al.’s set
up. Haselgrove justifies this assumption on the
basis that Beckers et al. did not demonstrate that
the cues used were entirely different stimuli and
point to the fact that five of the six used were of
the same modality (auditory). I suggest that it is
not unreasonable to assume that some constitu-
ents of the immediate environment could act as
common elements, especially as the experi-
ments were all conducted in identical operant
chambers. In addition, even some researchers
who question the validity of Haselgrove’s as-
sumptions (e.g., Guez & Stevenson, 2011) con-
cede that the Beckers et al. (2006) results may
well be within the explanatory power of asso-
ciative models. For example, Schmajuk and
Larrauri (2008) argue that causal learning is
adequately explained by their attentional-
associative model and they, too, provide evi-
dence by way of mathematical models that rep-
licate rat experimental results, implying that
noncognitive mechanisms may be operative in
rats. This possibility ought to be ruled out be-
fore we accept the strong conclusion of infer-
ential thinking. Given this, the Beckers et al.
(2006) results cannot be considered sufficient
evidence of causal reasoning.
Table 4
Beckers et al.’s (2006) Experiment 3
Condition Group (i) (ii) (iii)
Inference X 
cause?
Expected effect:
Blocking?
Relative lever
pressing
Maximal Test   A AX ✓
Control   B AX ✓
Submaximal high Test   A AX ✓
Control   B AX ✓
Submaximal low Test   A AX ✓
Control   B AX ✓
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Interventions
According to Blaisdell et al. (2006), in their
experiments rats made causal inferences that
cannot be explained by associative theories.
Blaisdell (2009) suggests that these inferences
are based on the flexible use of representations
(p. 168), which seems to imply conceptual
thought. Although Blaisdell stops short of ex-
plicitly claiming that rats are rational (A. Blais-
dell, personal communication, October 18,
2011), it is clear that a case for rationality in rats
can be made on the basis of his causal reasoning
experiments, and there is no shortage of authors
who explicitly do so (e.g., Clayton & Dickin-
son, 2006; Mitchell, De Houwer, and Lovibond,
2009).
Blaisdell et al. (2006) trained rats such that
subsequent to a 10-s flickering light (L) they
were presented with either a 10-s tone (T) or 10
seconds of sucrose delivery (‘common cause’).
The rats were also trained to associate a 10-s
noise (N) with simultaneous delivery of 10 sec-
onds of sucrose (F; see Figure 4). In the test
phase of Experiment 1 rats were allocated to
one of four conditions in which a lever was
available, which was not available during the
training. These conditions were intervene-T,
observe-T, intervene-N, and observe-N. In the
intervene-T condition, rats were presented with
a 10-s T on pressing the lever, whereas in ob-
serve-T pressing the lever had no effect but T
was presented ‘randomly’ (yoked to the Inter-
vene-T lever). The same rules held for inter-
vene-N and observe-N (see first three columns
in Figure 5). The number of nose pokes into the
food aperture was recorded as a measure of the
rats’ expectation of F.
According to Blaisdell et al. (2006), rats in
the observe-T condition should reason that T
was caused by L (but L was ‘missed’) so F
should also be present, as F is also caused by L.
By contrast, rats in the intervene-T condition
should reason that because the cause of T was
their own intervention (a lever press) rather than
L, then F would not be present. If so, this
predicts a lower rate of nose pokes for inter-
vene-T than for observe-T. By contrast, there
should be no difference in nose pokes between
intervene-N and observe-N, as the rats would
reason that N is a direct cause of F irrespective
of lever presses. The average number of nose
pokes per 10-s presentation of T or N is com-
pared in the last column in Figure 5. The re-
searchers found a significant difference in nose
pokes between the intervene-T and observe-T
conditions, but less so between the intervene-N
and observe-N conditions, as predicted.
Blaisdell et al. claim that the results are in-
consistent with associative theories but consis-
tent with Bayes net predictions. Later, I discuss
Bayes nets in the context of inferential reason-
ing, but first I consider how these results can be
used to directly justify a claim of rationality.
There are at least two areas in which explicit
inferential reasoning can be invoked to explain
the observed behavior. The first relates to the
fact that in the test phase the rats searched for F
when T occurred even though L was never
presented, despite the fact that during training
either T or F was presented following L but not
both. Blaisdell (2009) explains the rats’ expec-
tation of F by reference to an acquired ‘causal
map’ which he represents as: Tone ¢ Light ¡
Food. Regarding the absence of L, Blaisdell et
al. (2006) comment that “Apparently, in the
initial phases of learning, rats tend to conserva-
tively treat the absent but expected events as
possibly present but missed” (p. 1021). Thus,
Figure 4. Training phase of the causal reasoning experiments. Note. Rats were trained to
expect food delivery (F) alongside a stimulus of noise (N); food delivery (F) subsequent to a
flickering light (L); and tone (T) subsequent to flickering light (L).
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the reasoning during the observe-T condition
can be construed along the following lines:
Observe-T
1. L causes T
2. L (also) causes F
3. T occurred, therefore L must have oc-
curred (and I must have missed it)
4. As L also causes F and L must have oc-
curred, F will occur
The second case of possible inferential rea-
soning is in regard to the intervene-T condition
in which the rat attributes the occurrence of T to
its own lever-pressing action rather than to a
‘missed’ L. This can be construed along the
following lines:
Intervene-T
5. T was caused by my intervention (lever
press), not by L
6. As there was no L, F will not occur
I now raise several issues that cast substantial
doubt on whether Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) ex-
periments are sufficient evidence of rationality
in rats. Several of these are similar to the ob-
jections raised to Beckers et al. (2006) above.
Blaisdell et al. compare rats’ apparent ability to
combine individually learned causal links into
complex causal models with those abilities in
humans, citing Perales, Catena, and Maldonado
(2004). However, as argued above, even if (ex-
clusively) rational processes were involved in
the human case that does not guarantee that the
same processes are involved in the rat case.
Furthermore, as Perales et al. (2004) point out,
data-driven (i.e., associative) and cognitively
driven (i.e., causal-model based) theories can
coexist as different learning strategies rather
than alternative and mutually exclusive mecha-
nisms. Again, if humans’ results may be ac-
counted for on the basis of associative mecha-
nisms, the same may hold true for rats,
rendering suspect the argument by analogy with
humans as a sufficient basis for ascribing ratio-
nality to rats.
As can be seen in Figure 4, differences are
apparent in the training regimes for different
conditions. The direct cause association was
trained by simultaneous presentation of the stimuli
at 100% reliability. The common cause training as-
sociated the light/food and light/tone pairings at
reliability of only 50% each and the presenta-
tions were not simultaneous but forward-paired.
Figure 5. Test (extinction) phase of the causal reasoning experiment. Nose pokes in the
Intervene-T condition are lower, as predicted.
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It is difficult to predict how these differences
might have affected the outcomes, but it might
be significant enough to account for the failure
to replicate the results in other labs (see below).
As reviewed in the Transitive Inference section,
there can be quite subtle and unexpected effects
resulting from mediated conditioning and vari-
able strength pairings. Indeed, Blaisdell himself
agrees that repeating the experiment with prop-
erly aligned training regimes would be a worth-
while endeavor (A. Blaisdell, personal commu-
nication, October 19, 2011).
Plausible noncognitive accounts for the
Blaisdell et al. results do exist, such as
Delamater’s (2011) ‘limited capacity process-
ing’ and Dwyer, Starns, and Honey’s (2009)
‘response competition’ account. Delamater sug-
gests the possibility that lever press responses
require processing within a limited capacity
system in the rat. First, assume that the common
cause training (see Figure 4) has led to an as-
sociation between T and F via mediated condi-
tioning. Then, it is possible that the processing
required in the rat’s brain for the lever press in
the Intervene-T condition results in less effec-
tive processing of the subsequent T and this
reduces the rat’s ability to activate the associa-
tion with F (and hence lower rate of nose
pokes). The fact that this effect is not observed
in the Intervene-N control groups could be ac-
counted for if this limited capacity processing
effect is greater for mediated conditioning com-
pared with direct cause conditioning, a hypoth-
esis that should be testable.
Delamater’s (2011) suggestion is akin to Dw-
yer et al.’s (2009) theory that the reduced nose
pokes in the Intervene-T condition is attribut-
able to response competition between lever
pressing and nose pokes. Dwyer et al. replicated
the Blaisdell et al. (2006) experimental design10
but although they also observed the intervene/
observe difference, they note that this effect was
at least as apparent in the direct cause condition
as for the common cause condition; hence the
findings were not replicated. Unlike Blaisdell et
al. (2006), Dwyer et al. (2009) recorded the
number of lever presses during presentation of
stimuli. Their results show an inverse relation-
ship between levels of lever pressing and mag-
azine entries thereby supporting the view that
the lower levels of lever pressing in the Inter-
vene conditions were due to response competi-
tion rather than causal reasoning.
Even if Dwyer et al.’s (2009) idea of re-
sponse competition is correct, this does not
mean that rats are incapable of causal reasoning;
perhaps in their experiments response competi-
tion masked the causal reasoning effect. To test
this idea Burgess, Dwyer, and Honey (2012)
designed several experiments to test for causal
reasoning while minimizing response competi-
tion (e.g., by removing the lever immediately
following a press or pretraining with a lever to
avoid the effect of a novelty stimulus). Not only
were Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) findings not rep-
licated, neither were all of Dwyer et al.’s
(2009). In particular, Burgess et al.’s (2012)
Experiment 3 secured results that were the exact
opposite of that predicted by causal map theory:
Rats in the common-cause group responded
more to T in the (equivalent of) the ‘Inter-
vene-T’ condition than the ‘Observe-T’ condi-
tion.11
Differences in experimental set-up (e.g., rat
species used, control of possible confounding
factors) may account for these differing results,
but this lack of robustness for the Blaisdell et al.
(2006) results implies that those findings do not
constitute reliable and therefore sufficient evi-
dence of inferential reasoning in rats.
Mathematical models that replicate the Blais-
dell et al. (2006) results cast further doubt on
the reasoning ability hypothesis. Kutlu and
Schmajuk (2012) successfully implemented a
mathematical simulation of the causal reasoning
experiments based on a 1996 model known as
the attentional-associative model. Their model
incorporates a mechanism that modulates atten-
tion to the CS in proportion to the total novelty
detected in the environment and forms CS-CS
and CS-US excitatory and inhibitory associa-
tions according to a real-time competitive rule.
By adjusting the model’s parameters—analo-
gous to tweaking experimental factors such the
choice of rat species—the mathematical simu-
10 Not quite an exact replication: Dwyer et al. (2009)
measured the amount of time spent in the magazine as
compared with Blaisdell et al. (2006), who measured the
number of entries into the magazine (nose pokes). Never-
theless, Dwyer et al.’s measure is appropriate because their
hypothesis is that more time spent on one response (maga-
zine entry) limits the amount of time available for the other
response (lever pressing).
11 I am using Blaisdell et al.’s nomenclature rather than
Burgess et al.’s for consistency in the comparison.
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lation of Blaisdell et al.’s experiments yields
comparable results.
Blaisdell et al. suggested that an explanation
should be sought compatible with Bayes net
theories in lieu of associative theories, yet the
two should not be considered mutually exclu-
sive. Although at a high level Bayesian nets are
intended to be models of (cognitive) causal in-
ference (Pearl, 1997), at a neural level Bayesian
processing might be how the brain implements
learned associations. Bayes’s theorem provides
a mathematical procedure for calculating con-
ditional probabilities, which begins with an as-
sumed ‘prior’ probability of an event (say, the
existence of food at a particular time and place)
that is modified by subsequent incoming data to
produce an updated ‘posterior’ probability. It is
not unreasonable to assume that priors are de-
termined in animals via their evolutionary his-
tory and individual previous experiences (Mc-
Namara, Green, & Olsson, 2006). Current
experiences then provide the incoming data that
can modify the prior to produce a posterior. In
the context of rat experiments, the reinforce-
ment schedule provides the incoming data. The
fact that the rat’s behavior changes as a function
of learned associations is evidence of the deri-
vation of a posterior. Conceivably, the posteri-
ors are somehow encoded as combinations of
action potentials at the neuronal level. Thus,
associative and low level Bayesian-based expla-
nations are not mutually exclusive.
From a ‘top down’ perspective, several
other arguments give reason to doubt that
Blaisdell et al.’s (2006) experiments are suf-
ficient evidence of rationality in rats. If the
inference in the Intervene-T condition was
that ‘T was not caused by L and therefore
there would be no F,’ then why were the
nose-pokes not zero? Blaisdell suggests that
“even if the rats thought it unlikely that food
would be there they would have a look-see
just to be sure” (A. Blaisdell, personal com-
munication, October 18, 2011). Nevertheless,
one must question how many such nose pokes
would be conducted before a rational rat
came to the conclusion that there was no point
checking. To put the point another way, it is
difficult to support a conclusion of rationality
when the baseline is so arbitrary and the dif-
ferences in above-baseline behavior so mar-
ginal. Of course we do expect the rat to go
and check for food. As one commentator on
this paper remarked, the food giving appara-
tus is itself a stimulus. But that is an associa-
tive explanation, not one based on rationality.
The same commentator remarked that the rats
would be “stupid” (sic) to not check for food
and I would not disagree—indeed, it is only if
the rat were rational that it would not check
for food. Or course, checking for food in this
case does not therefore preclude the possibil-
ity that the rats are rational; they may be
rational yet still go have a ‘look-see.’ My
point is that the behavior does not constitute
sufficient evidence of rationality. Note also
that whether or not a rat can be “stupid” is
precisely the question I am addressing be-
cause noncognitive systems can be neither
smart nor stupid, only ‘programmatic.’ To
call a creature stupid implies that it is capable
of reasoning (faulty or not) in the first place.
Furthermore, note that the rats never grasp
the fact that when L has caused T then F does
not occur and vice versa. Blaisdell et al.’s
(2006) explanation is that “With few learning
trials, rats tend to integrate individual learning
relations into a coherent integrated model. Only
after many trials do rats encode the explicit
absence of the nonpresented cues” (p. 1021).
This seems to imply that to form an association
between T and lack of F requires more extensive
training. Whether true or not this is an associa-
tive type account and does not support a con-
clusion of rat rationality. Finally, in the ob-
serve-T condition why should we accept the
supposition that the rats assume that L was
present but simply missed? Are rational crea-
tures likely to continue to make this error time
and again?
Given the doubts raised above, these experi-
ments cannot be considered sufficient evidence
of rationality in rats. Rats do appear to perceive
some ‘causal’ relations such as that T follows L
and F follows L and when the lever is pressed T
occurs, but there is no need to assume inferen-
tial capacities for this type of ‘causal reason-
ing.’ As mentioned earlier, Hoerl (2011) main-
tains that there are primitive abilities to ‘grasp’
the causal power of objects that do not imply
concept possession. Indeed, alternative experi-
mental paradigms aimed at investigating causal
reasoning in rats supports the view that causal
learning is explicable in an associative frame-
work based on associations between contiguous
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exogenous events (Polack, McConnell, &
Miller, 2013).
Goal Orientation
Since the early 1980s experiments on instru-
mental learning in rats have challenged the pre-
vailing dogma that lever-press acquisition was
controlled solely by sensorimotor learning in-
volving a process of stimulus-response (S-R)
association and instead suggested that animals
are capable of a more elaborate form of encod-
ing based on the response–outcome (R–O) as-
sociation.12 The S-R system is responsible for
habitual behaviors whereas the R-O system is
said to be responsible for goal-directed actions
and these systems compete (and cooperate) in
decision-making. Indeed, brain-imaging studies
implicate differing regions in the human brain
for these activities and homologous regions in
rodent brains (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010).
Once again, given this correspondence between
human and rat brains, and between some human
and rat behavior, it is tempting to conclude that
similar processing occurs in both species. To
wit, because humans use prefrontal cortex in
rational decision-making and rats employ a ho-
mologous brain region for apparently analogous
behaviors, then it appears reasonable to claim
that rats are similarly capable of rational
thought (e.g., Dickinson, 1985).
Dickinson (1985) contends that at least some
behavior in rats is under teleological control and
cannot be explained at the psychological level
in terms of internal associations:
Rather, we argue that the knowledge about the action-
goal relation must be encoded in a propositional-like
form so that it can be operated on by a practical
inference process to generate the instrumental perfor-
mance. In this sense actions are inherently rational in a
way that responses can never be. (Dickinson, 1985,
p. 78)
Apparently Dickinson not only believes that
rats are rational but that they entertain thoughts
in propositional-like form. More recently, Dick-
inson (2012) has argued that a rat’s ‘practical
reasoning’ capacity emerges from associative
processes though it is not clear how closely
‘practical reasoning’ matches our use of the
term rationality. In fact, his description of cog-
nition as arising from architectural constraints
on associative processes seems to be a very
mechanistic model. Nevertheless, Dickinson
and Balleine’s (2010) explanation for the results
of goal-orientation experiments with rats as-
sumes conceptual ability in the form of abstract
representations of goal values (A. Dickinson,
personal communication, January 31, 2013). I
review these claims below.
The Palermo Protocol
The best way to explain the significance of
the rat experiment described below is to begin
with the event that inspired it (Dickinson &
Balleine, 2010). One day during a Sicilian hol-
iday, Dickinson (AD) chanced upon a market
selling watermelons and learned, first, how to
subsequently navigate his way to the market,
and second, that watermelon (never before
tasted) is an excellent thirst-quencher. That eve-
ning he became horribly sick on the local red
wine. A couple of days later, a thirsty AD again
sought out the market but this time on sampling
the watermelon he experienced nausea and the
watermelon so disgusted him that he has not
partaken since. AD later learned that a single
pairing of a novel flavor with gastric sickness
can condition an aversion to the flavor even
after an hour or more. AD’s sickness had been
paired with the novel-flavored watermelon
rather than the familiar red wine. What we can
take from this story is that AD attained a con-
ditioned aversion to watermelon but he did not
know it until he went back for another taste.
Thus it appears that a dual psychology is in
operation: as a cognitive creature, AD’s search
for watermelon was a “rational and intentional
action” (Dickinson & Balleine, 2010, p. 75, my
emphasis) controlled by his belief and desire
about watermelons. On the other hand, AD’s
nausea was a manifestation of nonrepresenta-
tional, reflex psychology.
12 This view is still disputed. For example, Rescorla
(1990) surmised that instrumental training may result in
more elaborate hierarchical structures involving not just the
stimulus (S) and the response (R) but also the outcome (O)
in an analogous way to the standard S-R paradigm in a
structure “of the form S-(R-O) in which the R-O association
itself becomes associated with the stimulus” (p. 262). Re-
scorla successfully designed and tested S-(R-O) analogues
to three standard Pavlovian phenomena (Kamin blocking
effect; CS-US contingency; relative stimulus validity) and
found results “consistent with the view that learning entails
the development of an association between the stimulus and
the R-O relation” (p. 269).
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Balleine and Dickinson (1991) designed an
experiment to test if rats, too, are subject to a
dual psychology, which would imply that they
are possibly capable of rationality. In the rat
analogue the instrumental action is a lever press
(in place of navigating to the market); the rein-
forcer is sucrose solution (in place of water-
melon); and the latent aversion was induced by
lithium chloride solution (instead of red wine).
Each phase of the experiment was carried out on
subsequent days:
(i) Rats were first given magazine training
without levers present and then pretrained to
lever press with a water reinforcer (reinforcers
were presented throughout in the magazine);
finally, lever pressing was extinguished.
(ii) All rats were trained in a single session to
associate a sucrose solution with lever pressing;
half the rats were then given an immediate
injection of lithium chloride whereas the other
half were given the injection after a delay of 6
hours.
(iii) Each of these groups was then further
subdivided, half given access to sucrose solu-
tion and the other water, thereby creating four
test groups in all.
(iv) In the test (extinction) phase, each group
had access to a lever without reinforcement and
lever pressing was counted.
(v) Finally, to establish that aversion had
taken place, all rats were rewarded for lever-
pressing with 30 presentations of water, after
which the water presentation was replaced by
sucrose.
The schedule is depicted on the left side of
Table 5 (excluding the final reacquisition
phase). The right side of Table 5 shows the
results.
According to Dickinson (2008), the results of
the experiment (and subsequent variations and
extensions) replicate the events in the AD story.
The IMM-H2O group acts like AD before he
discovered the watermelon aversion: they lever-
press at the same rate as the two delayed-
injection groups (DEL-SUC and DEL-H2O)
that experience no aversion. Just as AD sought
out watermelon when thirsty, the IMM-H2O
group act as if unaware of their latent aversion
and hence press the lever in attempts to gain
sucrose. This is the expected result, because that
group has not been reexposed to sucrose follow-
ing the lithium chloride injection. Conversely,
the IMM-SUC group members were reexposed
to sucrose and were therefore apparently con-
sciously aware of their aversion to it. This group
consequently (‘rationally’) chose to avoid su-
crose (by avoiding lever pressing), like AD after
he was reexposed to watermelon and conse-
quently avoided future contact.
I begin my analysis with several pertinent
observations. First, in the AD story the subject
totally avoided the reinforcer following the re-
exposure, whereas in the experiment the rele-
vant rats did not totally avoid pressing the lever
but only (albeit, significantly) reduced lever-
pressing. In the human case, if we interpret the
total avoidance of the nausea-inducing sub-
stance as rational behavior, how should we in-
terpret the contrasting rat case? The rat behavior
does not preclude the existence of rationality,
but the case for rationality is not as strong as it
would be if the rats had totally avoided pressing
the lever.
The second observation concerns the number
of magazine entries following lever pressing
(far right column in Table 5). The ‘rationality’
interpretation of the results relies on there being
a difference between the IMM-SUC and IMM-
DEL groups; however, the results for these
groups are comparable if we compare magazine
Table 5
Schedule for Experiment 1 in Balleine and Dickinson (1991)
Group
(i)
Pre-training
(ii)
(iii)
Free access
(iv)
Extinction
Test results
Training Aversion
Lever
presses
Magazine
entries
IMM-SUC Lever ¡ H2O Lever ¡ SUC Immediate LiCl SUCROSE Lever ¡ A 62 61
IMM-H2O Lever ¡ H2O Lever ¡ SUC Immediate LiCl H2O Lever ¡ A 130 53
DEL-SUC Lever ¡ H2O Lever ¡ SUC Delayed-LiCl SUCROSE Lever ¡ A 120 110
DEL-H2O Lever ¡ H2O Lever ¡ SUC Delayed-LiCl H2O Lever ¡ A 132 148
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entries rather than lever presses. The experi-
mental analogue of AD’s instrumental action
(navigating to the market) was assumed to be
lever pressing. But if magazine entry is consid-
ered to be the relevant analogue the results are
consistent with an associative account. As dis-
cussed earlier in the Transitive Inference section,
unpaired stimuli can be associated through medi-
ated conditioning. Thus, the pairing (magazine ¡
sucrose) coupled with the pairing (sucrose ¡
sickness) should be sufficient to induce an asso-
ciation of the form (magazine ¡ sucrose ¡ sick-
ness), which would then cause the rats to avoid
entering the magazine to seek the expected su-
crose.
Nevertheless, the above suggestion can only
be part of the story because we require an ad-
ditional account for the fact that the IMM-SUC
group pressed the lever at a significantly lower
rate. To account for the results of the Palermo
experiment, Dickinson and Balleine (2010) ar-
gue that goal-oriented behavior is mediated by
goal value, which according to Dickinson “ends
up yielding an abstract representation of value
(in the form of a desire) that can enter into
inference processes, which is highly concep-
tual” (A. Dickinson, personal communication,
January 31, 2013). Thus the argument for ratio-
nality hinges on the view that a rat’s encoding
of goal value is conceptual. I present an alter-
native account of ‘goal value’ based on the
concept of ‘affordance’ that does not rely on
assuming conceptual abilities in rats.
Affordance
Affordance (Gibson, 1979) is a well-known
theory developed to explain animals’ perception
of the ‘values’ of objects in their environment:
“The affordances of the environment are what it
offers the animal” (p. 127). There is no require-
ment for concept possession in affordance de-
tection (e.g., “You do not have to classify and
label things in order to perceive what they af-
ford” (Gibson, 1979, p. 134). The idea of affor-
dance has been debated among psychologists
with some suggesting that there are different
types, some of which actually do require con-
ceptual abilities (Hartson, 2003; Norman,
1988). However, the notion of affordance that
supposedly relies on conceptual abilities (‘cog-
nitive affordance’) applies specifically to hu-
mans (and thus presumes the existence of con-
cepts). This notion of affordance primarily
concerns the principles for appropriately de-
signing devices for human usage. The type I lay
claim to with regard to the case at hand—that is,
animal detection of affordances—is called
‘physical affordance’ and does not rely on con-
ceptual abilities. As earlier discussed, reasoning
requires concept possession. Below I show that
the rats’ learning of goal values in the Palermo
Protocol can be explained by the mechanism of
physical affordance and so does not require the
ability to reason.
Gibson emphasizes that in detecting an ob-
ject’s affordance the subject must learn its “true
nature” (p. 142). For example: “consider sub-
stances that afford ingestion. Some afford nu-
trition for a given animal, some afford poison-
ing, and some are neutral” (p. 137). In the
appropriate context, learning an object’s true
nature means learning its goal value. In the
Palermo experiment the rat not only detects that
a lever affords pressing but also learns the na-
ture of what it delivers. All the rats learn the
affordance of the lever to deliver an ingestible.
Following re-exposure (phase iii) the IMM-
SUC rats learn that the ingestible item (sucrose)
affords poisoning and thus its negative goal
value.
The above account based on affordance de-
tection is at odds with Dickinson and Balleine’s
(2010) account only because of Dickinson’s
insistence that the rats encode ‘desire’13 in the
form of an abstract representation of value. I
agree that rats are most likely capable of mental
representations,14 but these do not necessarily
need to be of an abstract form indicative of
concept possession. ‘Desires’ that we can ex-
pect to find in a rat such as those elicited by
thirst or hunger are visceral, not abstract. The
notion of ‘goal value’ can be expressed in terms
13 I use scare quotes for ‘desire’ here because in another
context it is one of the propositional attitudes (including
‘belief,’ ‘fear,’ and so on) and this alone would presume
propositional thoughts and hence concept possession. How-
ever ‘desire’ is commonly used in the context of animal
behavior without assuming the existence of propositional
thoughts.
14
‘Mental representations’ in this context need not imply
abstract or intentional representations. For example, it is
likely that rats entertain visual images of seen objects,
which are examples of simple mental representations that
need not involve concept possession (Savanah, 2012).
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of ‘strength of desire’ with no need to assume
that the rat possesses concepts.
I suspect that one major reason Dickinson is
willing to attribute concept possession (and
hence the potential for rationality) to rats is his
belief that we only need to consider two broad
levels: “S-R robots and cognitive creatures that
are also endowed with intentional representa-
tions, affective experience, and the ability to
integrate the two in consciousness” (Dickinson
& Balleine, 2000, p. 201). The Model I propose
includes an intermediate level (in which affor-
dance is the operative mechanism) that is above
the ‘beast machine’ though below the level of
rationality. Compare this with Hurley (2003)
who also sees behavioral flexibility as not an
all-or-nothing capacity: “instrumental behavior
is further along the spectrum in the direction of
rational flexibility [than classical S-R behav-
ior]” (p. 237). Hurley describes this level of
agency as “flexible holistic relations between
ends and means” (p. 237), which is strikingly
reminiscent of how Gibson (1979, p. 143) de-
scribes affordance: the “inseparability” (holism)
of the “possibilities of the environment” (the
ends) and the “way of life of the animal” (the
means). Later, Hurley (2006) talks of nonhu-
man animals as occupying ‘islands of practical
rationality’ (note the qualifier, which distin-
guishes it from the notion of rationality I am
discussing), which she describes as domain-
specific reasons for action despite a lack of
conceptual abilities.
Future Research on Rat Rationality
To test for reasoning in animals, as discussed
earlier, it will be necessary to eliminate behav-
ior that can be accounted for as programmatic,
such as species typical behaviors or behaviors
acquired via associative learning. In addition,
the test should be impervious to three prominent
objections emerging from this study: (a) the
inadequacy of arguments by analogy to human
behavior or homologous human/rat brain re-
gions; (b) the ability to replicate results using a
noncognitive system such as a mathematical
model; and (c) the existence of ‘nonzero ef-
fects.’ The experiment I propose to meet these
criteria is the Staircase Test.
In essence, the Staircase Test requires rat
subjects to fashion a tool to solve a novel prob-
lem that they would not encounter in their nor-
mal environments. The tool is simply two
blocks of different size pushed together to cre-
ate a climbing frame that allows the rat to reach
a high platform containing a food reward. The
idea is to train the subjects in the basic skills
(pushing and climbing blocks of a certain size)
and then test whether they can combine these
skills in a novel (i.e., untrained) way to solve a
problem (reaching food). The test meets our
criteria because, in the first place, although the
subject will apply actions that are already in its
repertoire, the target behavior entails a complex
combination of those actions that is neither spe-
cies typical nor trained. Second, the test does
not rely on comparison with analogous human
behavior or brain regions. Third, I warrant that
the behavior will not be replicable by a mathe-
matical model (though of course this should be
tested). Finally, to avoid the nonzero effects
objection, I am content to set the base rate at
zero and accept a single instance of success as
sufficient evidence of rationality: A suitable
configuration of the test set up will ensure a
vanishingly low probability that the target be-
havior will be stumbled upon by random chain-
ing of the trained actions (see phase iv descrip-
tion below).
I will rely on researchers to construct their
version of the experiment according to best
practices and pragmatic considerations. Accord-
ingly, my explanation below includes only the
key elements of the experiment and excludes
considerations such as the reward presentation
method, training session length and frequency,
apparatus and chamber dimensions, and so
forth.
The Staircase Test
Phase (i): Training. Using a suitable re-
ward to train the rats to push two different-sized
blocks. Block 1 is more-or-less cube shaped,
and Block 2 is a rectangular prism exactly dou-
ble the height of Block 1 (see Figure 6, panel i).
Block 1 should be of a size that just allows the
rat to climb onto it (see next phase). Block 2
should stand like a column and designed to
prevent toppling. Rats are rewarded for pushing
either block by a minimum of a set distance.
Phase (ii): Training. Train the rats to
climb on top of Block 1 only (see Figure 6,
panel ii). The rats learn that they can reach up a
certain height. Note that if Block 1 and Block 2
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are adjacent the height from Block 1 to the top
of Block 2 is also climbable, though this is not
specifically trained.
Phase (iii): Training. In a new chamber
one wall has a high platform (exactly as high as
three stacked Block 1s). The platform is acces-
sible via a ramp (removable by the experimenter
for the test phase). The rats are trained to expect
food on the platform (see Figure 6, panel iii).
Phase (iv): Test phase. The trained rat is
placed in the chamber, which contains Block 1
and Block 2 appropriately positioned to mini-
mize chance success (i.e., distant from the each
other and from the platform; see Figure 6, panel
iv). A food reward is visible on the platform and
the ramp has been removed. The question asked
is does the rat work out how to retrieve the food
item? (see Figure 7).
Despite the fact that this test sets the bar
deliberately high, note that a skeptic (that is, an
even greater skeptic than I) might still dispute
that passing the Staircase Test is evidence of
rationality. For example, it might be claimed
that the rat detects the affordance of a climbing
rig for reaching the platform. I would respond
that this could only happen after pushing the
blocks together and positioning the whole stair-
case under the platform, a planned combination
of actions derivable only through inferential
reasoning. Of course I would be more than
pleased to engage in such a debate but I submit
that the occasion will never arise as no rat will
ever pass the test.
Conclusion
Many researchers are willing to ascribe actual
rationality to rats on the basis of the experi-
ments analyzed herein. These researchers are to
be commended on their many ingenious exper-
Figure 6. Schematic depiction of the Staircase Test. Panels (i) – (iii) are three separate
training regimes. Panel (iv) shows the test phase set up.
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imental designs, but their results can be beguil-
ing. Spatial navigation abilities are implemented
probably by several different noncognitive mech-
anisms in different species. As such, rats’ abilities
in this regard remain inconclusive as demonstra-
tions of rationality. The results of metacognition
experiments using the bail-out paradigm are
adequately explicable using traditional associa-
tive accounts. More complex associative theo-
ries are needed to account for some rat behav-
ior. For example, Zentall (2001) demonstrated
that there are many yet-to-be uncovered and
subtle associative processes at work in the tran-
sitive inference effect.
A close examination of the causal reasoning
experiments yields many issues that cast serious
doubt on a conclusion that rats can reason.
Probably the most convincing of all the para-
digms explored here is Dickinson’s Palermo
Protocol (Dickinson & Balleine, 2010). Never-
theless, the level of cognition required to ade-
quately account for the Palermo results need not
extend to rationality; the now decades-old the-
ory of affordance (Gibson, 1979) suffices.
Despite these misgivings, I expect that many
researchers will remain convinced that their rats
can reason. My challenge to them is the Stair-
case Test, the passing of which would convince
me unequivocally of rat rationality.
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